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Words have a weight: language as a source of inner grounding and flexibility in abstract
concepts
Abstract:
The role played by language in our cognitive lives is a topic at the centre of contemporary
debates in cognitive (neuro)science. In this paper we illustrate and compare two theories that
offer embodied explanations of this role: the WAT (Words As social Tools) and the LENS
(Language is an Embodied Neuroenhancement and Scaffold) theories. WAT and LENS differ
from other current proposals because they connect the impact of the neurologically realized
language system on our cognition to the ways in which language shapes our interaction with the
physical and social environment. Examining these theories together, their tenets and supporting
evidence, sharpens our understanding of each, but also contributes to a better understanding of
the contribution that language might make to the acquisition, representation and use of abstract
concepts. Here we focus on how language provides a source of inner grounding, especially
metacognition and inner speech, and supports the flexibility of our thought. Overall, the paper
outlines a promising research program focused on the importance of language to abstract
concepts within the context of a flexible, multimodal, and multilevel conception of embodied
cognition.
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Words have a weight: language as a source of inner grounding and flexibility in abstract
concepts
1. Introduction
What role does language play in our cognitive lives? Is it a rich source of inner grounding
or simply a vehicle for communicating our thoughts? Our purpose in this essay is to examine the
varied ways in which grounded simulations of linguistic experience might help us acquire,
represent, and use new concepts. The idea under consideration is that the multimodal networks
associated with the dynamic production and processing of language provide an effective means
of acquiring information that goes beyond our immediate experience. These networks can play a
role in most concepts but are especially important in abstract concepts. We identify some of the
ways that embodied language influences the acquisition and retrieval of abstract knowledge by
acting as a source of inner grounding and means of social action. We defend the thesis that
words, as physical symbols that we manipulate in an embodied fashion, enable us to leverage
cognitive resources that would not be available to us otherwise: they enhance our perception,
they allow us to sharpen and refine our representation of categories, particularly of those that are
not directly tied to our immediate experience; they provide a means of coordinating context- and
task-specific content; and they facilitate metacognitive processes that evaluate other cognitive
operations. The capacity to act in a grounded way with language by means of sensorimotor
re-presentations supports these cognitive and metacognitive functions, which are central to our
capacity for abstract thought.
In what follows, we consider two theories - the Words As social Tools, or WAT, theory
(Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi et al., 2017; 2019a) and the Language is an Embodied
Neuroenhancement and Scaffold, or LENS, theory (Dove, 2019) - which propose that embodied
language plays an active and significant role in our thinking and in our interaction with the
physical and social environment. Both theories are committed to an embodied approach to
cognition in which our concepts are grounded in experiential systems, and both claim that the
grounded language system makes a number of significant contributions to our capacity to
conceptualize our world and our social environment. Although these theories differ in their
details and focus, they share the view that language is a significant embodied resource that
transforms our cognitive niche (Clark, 2006).
2. What are abstract concepts?
Compared to concrete concepts like “bottle”, abstract concepts like “freedom” typically
refer more to events, mental states, and situations and less to clearly bounded, manipulable
objects or entities. Abstract concepts are often more flexible with respect to their semantic
content since they generally refer to relations between elements. A good example is the concept
“cause”, which involves an actor, an action, an object/patient etc. (Pulvermüller, 2018). With
respect to concrete concepts, abstract ones are more variable within and across individuals
(Borghi & Binkofski, 2014), and tend to be more contextually flexible (Falandays & Spivey,
2019). This higher contextual flexibility may render abstract concepts more variable also across
languages (Borghi, 2019; Kemmerer, 2019).
Approaching the distinction between concrete and abstract concepts as a dichotomy
would however be misleading, since many abstract concepts have concrete components and vice
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versa: for example, the concept of “money” can refer both to material and physical properties of
money as well as to more abstract elements, from social exchange to deontic positions
(Barsalou et al., 2018; Borghi et al., 2017; Tummolini & Castelfranchi, 2006). Furthermore,
these components might play a different role depending on the context. We therefore think that
abstractness/concreteness ratings or imageability ratings are not sufficient for their identification
(see Connell & Lynott, 2012 for supporting evidence).
A proper characterization of abstract concepts requires placing them
in a
multidimensional space. Specifically, compared to (more) concrete concepts, (more) abstract
concepts are generally acquired later (late Age of Acquisition, AoA) and more through language
and social interaction (e.g. when other people explain the meaning to us) than perception
(linguistic Modality of Acquisition, MoA). We depend on other people more to understand their
meanings (social metacognition; Borghi et al., 2018b). Concrete concepts are more imageable
(imageability; Paivio, 1990), they involve more bodily interactions with the external world
(Body Object Interaction, BOI, Tillotson et al., 2008), and they activate more contexts
(Schwanenflugel et al., 1992, Villani et al., 2019; Crutch et al., 2013; Troche et al., 2017).
Finally, one of the most interesting developments in the recent literature on the topic has
been the acknowledgement that a variety of abstract concepts exist (e.g. Borghi et al., 2018a).
Until a few years ago, the psychological and neuropsychological literature on concepts focused
mainly on distinctions between kinds of concrete concepts, such as that between natural objects
and artifacts (Warrington & Shallice, 1984, Forde & Humphreys, 2005), and more recently
between these two categories and those of natural and manufactured food (Rumiati & Foroni,
2016). In contrast, abstract concepts were treated as a unitary whole. Recently, however, a
number of studies have showed how rich the organization of abstract concepts is, from emotions
to philosophical and religious concepts, from theory of mind to numbers and time/space
concepts, to social concepts (Catricalà et al., 2014; Desai et al. 2018; Fingerhut & Prinz, 2018;
Fischer & Shaki 2018; Ghio et al. 2013; Harpaintner et al., 2018; Mellem et al. 2016; Roversi,
Borghi & Tummolini, 2013; Villani et al., 2019) and that they might differ in the
properties/dimensions they evoke (linguistic, interoceptive, exteroceptive, emotional, social,
etc.). In a rating task, Villani et al., (2019) demonstrated that different kinds of abstract concepts
exist, with a different degree of embodiment and of grounding in sensorimotor and interoceptive
experiences. Villani et al. (under review) also demonstrated with a behavioral interference
paradigm that interoception is more crucial for abstract concepts (in particular for emotional
concepts; see Connell et al., 2018) than it is for concrete concepts, and that manual action is
more crucial for concrete concepts and abstract concepts with more concrete physical,
spatio-temporal and quantitative content.
3. A multimodal and multilevel conception of grounding
Before we get to the specifics of the WAT and LENS theories, we need to do a bit of
housekeeping. Embodied theories come in different strengths (Meteyard et al., 2012). Strongly
embodied theories posit semantic representations that are fully constituted by experiential
simulations within primary affective and sensorimotor areas, and weakly embodied theories
leave room for higher-level modal, crossmodal, or even heteromodal representations and often
acknowledge that a degree of abstraction takes place within and between modalities (Simmons &
Barsalou, 2003; Vigliocco et al., 2004). In general, researchers are moving in the direction of
weak embodiment (Barsalou, 2016; Pulvermüller, 2013).
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Both the WAT and LENS theories are committed to a multimodal view of semantic
memory that relies on widely distributed conceptual representations. They hold that concepts
rely on a hierarchy of neural circuits that extend from modality-specific areas up to multimodal
areas located within association cortices (Binder, 2016; Ferandino et al., 2016; Garagnani,
Kiefer, & Pulvermüller, 2012; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). Heteromodal convergence zones
(Meyer & Damasio, 2009) or network hubs (van den Heuvel & Sporns, 2013) make important
contributions to our concepts. This hierarchical structure provides an explanation of how we are
able to generalize or abstract away from experience.
There are currently two major approaches to generalization that seek to explain it in terms
of cognitive architecture. The first views generalization in terms of so-called deep learning
(Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016). Buckner (2018) identifies a form of hierarchical
processing in deep convolutional neural networks that he refers to as “transformational
abstraction” in which sensory-based representations of category exemplars are iteratively
converted into new formats that are more tolerant of variation and noise. The second views
abstraction as a design feature of a hierarchical predictive coding view of neural functioning
(Friston, 2003). This view emphasizes the importance of the interaction between top-down
predictions and current sensory input in the explanation of action and perception (Clark, 2015).
Both of these approaches are compatible with the sort of multimodal and multilevel embodiment
favored by both WAT and LENS theories.
All of this leads to an important caveat: although language makes significant
contributions to our capacity for abstract concepts, it is not the sole source of generalization or
abstraction (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Dove, 2016). Even concrete concepts rely on a capacity
to abstract from category exemplars. More positively, both WAT and LENS propose that the
grounded language system serves as a rich source of inner grounding and social action within the
context of an inclusive version of embodiment.
4. The WAT and LENS theories
Several recent theories suggest that language contributes to our grounded conceptual
system. Some examples are Embodied Conceptual Combination or ECCo theory (Lynott &
Connell, 2010), Language and Situated Simulation or LASS theory (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons,
& Wilson, 2008), Language and Associations in thinking or LASSO theory (Tillas, 2015), and
Symbol Interdependency or SI theory (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010; Louwerse, 2011; 2018). In
addition, Conceptual Metaphor Theory or CMT ascribes a relevance to language by proposing
that knowledge is structured by metaphorical mappings from sensory experience and that
culturally specific knowledge can be reflected in metaphors that differ across languages
(Boroditsky, 2009; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003; Winter et al., 2015).
We can differentiate these theories in part by the importance that they assign to the language
system. The LASS theory, for example, treats language as little more than a cognitive shortcut
for embodied or grounded conceptual processing while the SI theory holds that linguistic
information plays a dominant role.
One of the defining features of the WAT and LENS theories is their commitment to
viewing language itself as a richly embodied phenomenon. This commitment enables them to
both acknowledge the power of nonlinguistic grounded cognition, which involves the
re-engagement of action, emotion, and perception representations, and identify a number of
significant contributions of language to our concepts in general and abstract concepts in
5

Words have a weight
particular. Although the WAT and LENS theories are broadly complementary to each other ,
they focus on different aspects of the contributions of language to cognition and are guided by
different research interests.
4.1 Words as social tools
The Words As social Tools (WAT) theory (Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Borghi & Binkofski,
2014; Borghi et al., 2019a) proposes that words can be considered as social tools useful to
modify and impact the social and physical environment, and as inner tools, useful to support and
refine our perception, categorization, thought processes (Borghi, under review; Lupyan &
Winter, 2018). With respect to abstract concepts this proposal has four main tenets, that we will
briefly summarize here (Borghi et al., 2019a):
a. The acquisition modality of concrete and abstract words differs: since abstract words
collect heterogeneous members and are not characterized by a unitary, well bounded referent,
they need more linguistic and social support to be acquired.
b. The neural representation of abstract concepts includes sensorimotor networks
(embodiment), but involves interoceptive, linguistic and social networks to a larger extent
than that of concrete ones.
c. Since linguistic experience as a whole is crucial for abstract concepts acquisition and
representation, the mouth motor system is actively involved during their acquisition and
processing, to a larger extent than what happens with concrete concepts.
d. Because linguistic experience is pivotal for abstract words, they are more influenced by
differences across cultures and spoken languages than concrete ones.
As suggested above (section 2), these predictions are made with the general assumption that the
concrete/abstract distinction is not a dichotomy, that it will be important to investigate and to
study differences within kinds of (concrete and) abstract concepts, and that new, more ecological
methods should be adopted to capture real conceptual use (see section 7 below).
Our elaboration of the WAT theory will only appeal to evidence directly collected by
Borghi, Barca, Tummolini and colleagues, and throughout this subsection the first person plural
pronoun will refer to them inclusively. The findings outlined below support the specific tenets
provided above. The overall behavioral and neuroscientific evidence consistent with WAT has
been discussed in a longer paper (Borghi et al., 2019a).
4.1.1 Embodiment and language in acquisition and processing (tenets a, b)
A number of our studies suggest an important role of sensorimotor, linguistic and
interoceptive systems in abstract concepts processing (tenets a, b), and show that the importance
of these dimensions varies depending on the considered sub-kinds of concepts (e.g. emotional vs.
philosophical). fMRI evidence with simple abstract and concrete sentences indicated that both
sensorimotor and linguistic neural networks are activated during abstract sentence processing
(Sakreida et al., 2013); evidence from a study on Italian Sign Language (LIS) showed that
different abstract concepts are represented using different levels of embodiment, and that for
some abstract concepts (e.g. “linguistics”, “truth”), LIS complemented iconic gestures with
6
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linguistic information derived from signed/spoken/written Italian or from other sign languages
(Borghi et al., 2014). Villani et al. (2019) in a rating study with 425 abstract concepts
demonstrated that the more abstract concepts are the later they are acquired and greater the
importance of the linguistic modality. Villani et al. (under review) have recently found with an
interference paradigm and a difficulty rating task that abstract concepts, particularly emotional
ones, are judged as more difficult while performing a concurrent interoceptive task - a result that
appears to reveal the importance of inner grounding for abstract concepts (see also Connell et al.,
2018). In the same study, there was also a condition in which participants were required to
perform a manual action (squeezing a ball) during conceptual processing. This interfering
condition led to an increase of the perceived difficulty of both concrete concepts and more
“concrete” abstract concepts, i.e. “physical, spatio-temporal and quantitative” abstract concepts
(e.g. acceleration, number, result).
4.1.2 Embodiment, language and social dimension (tenets a, b)
Villani et al. (2019) found that participants rated abstract concepts higher with respect to
the importance of “social metacognition” (how much they needed others to understand the word
meaning). Fini, Era, Darold, Candidi, and Borghi (2020) asked participants to guess the
abstract/concrete word represented by a picture and were given suggestions by two confederates.
Later they performed a motor interaction task (grasping a bottle) with an Avatar and were told
that the movements of the Avatar were controlled either by the confederate who gave them
suggestions on the abstract concepts or the one who gave them suggestions on the concrete
concepts; they were also told that a further guessing section would follow. Participants asked for
more hints to guess abstract concepts than they did to guess concrete concepts. More
importantly, as predicted, their movements were more synchronous with the Avatar controlled by
the person who gave them suggestions on abstract concepts. This finding is consistent with our
hypothesis that we need more help from others and tend to be more collaborative with abstract
concepts.
4.1.3 Evidence on the activation of the mouth motor system (tenet c)
We found a number of facilitation effects associated with the activity of the mouth motor
system. The processing of abstract words was facilitated with mouth compared to hand responses
(microphone or device among the teeth vs. keyboard) in tasks mimicking conceptual acquisition
in adults with novel concrete and abstract concepts and words (Borghi et al., 2011; Granito et al.,
2015). In a definition matching task, the facilitation in response times of hand responses was
limited to concrete words and not extended to abstract words (Borghi & Zarcone, 2016). A
facilitation of mouth responses with abstract words was found to be present in a recognition task
but not in a lexical decision task (Mazzuca et al., 2018). We have also collected TMS evidence
with sentences composed of concrete/abstract nouns and verbs showing early activation of
hand-related areas during processing of concrete verbs, and delayed activation of the same areas
during processing of abstract verbs; the result was interpreted as a cascade effect owing to a
previous mouth motor system activation (Scorolli et al., 2012).
Interference effects may also occur. A behavioral study on concrete/abstract
categorization (Zannino et al., submitted) revealed that abstract concepts are more impaired by a
concurrent articulatory suppression than by a concurrent ball squeezing task, suggesting that
inner speech plays an important role during their processing.
7
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The mouth motor system appears to influence conceptual development: in two
cross-sectional studies we found that the extended use of a device that interferes with
mouth/facial movements, the pacifier, affects the acquisition of abstract concepts and has a
long-term influence on their processing later in life (at least up to eight years of age). In a
definition task, 6-year-old typically developing children who had used the pacifier for a longer
period (e.g., more than 36 months of age) were as accurate as their classmates (Barca et al.,
2017). Verbal responses were also qualitatively coded based on the conceptual relations
produced for defining the concepts. We distinguished ‘concrete strategies’ such as those, for
example, referring to the perceptual properties of the concept as its shape and colours (e.g,
‘walnut - something that has a hard shell, that you have to break to eat it’), from more ‘abstract
strategies’ as those, for example, referring to social norms (e.g., ‘helmet - you have to put it to
ride a bicycle’). Children who used a pacifier for more than 36 months of age make more use of
concrete strategies such as exemplification and functional relations, and less of abstract
strategies. In contrast, those who did not use a pacifier used more abstract strategies as free
associations, or referred more frequently to social norms, or social-interactive situations.
Such an odd interference effect (since none of the tested children still used the pacifier,
nor did they use it during the task) also occurs with older children performing a different task. In
a categorization task, 8-year-olds who had used the pacifier for a longer time were slower to
respond to abstract than to emotional and concrete concepts (Barca et al., 2020). Pacifier use may
affect motor aspects of speech (interfering with the building and consolidation of fine-tuned
motor program) and auditory representations of speech (as the child receives an unstable trace of
his/her own speech; for an account of the pacifier effect within a neurocomputational model of
speech see Barca, 2019). Using the device in daytime during social interaction may interfere with
both speech articulators and online social feedback, two important factors in linguistic,
conceptual, and socio-emotional development (Pezzulo, Barca, D’Ausilio, 2014; Rychlowska
and Vanderwer, 2020). It may have a greater impact on the acquisition and processing of abstract
words as they are acquired later in life and rely more heavily on linguistically conveyed
information during social interaction.
Overall, current findings suggest that the use of a device that limits mouth/facial
movements during infancy and beyond might have a selective and long-term influence on the
acquisition and processing of abstract concepts for which the linguistic and social input is more
crucial.
4.1.4 Cross-linguistic studies, studies on different languages (tenet d)
Behavioral cross-linguistic evidence with Italian and German participants showed that
participants were faster with congruent sentences (abstract verb+noun, concrete verb+noun) than
with mixed combinations, and when in mixed combination responses were faster when the first
word was a concrete one, independent of the language and grammatical class of the wordInterestingly, however, there was an effect of language, linked to the different word order in
German and Italian (Scorolli et al., 2011). Behavioral evidence on Chinese two-character words
has revealed that Chinese participants are sensitive to the concreteness of their component
characters (D’Aversa et al., under review), while cross-linguistic evidence with Italian and
Iranian participants has shown that the interaction between concrete and abstract sentences and
action differs depending on the considered culture/language (Ghandhari et al., 2020). Further
studies with a free-listing task focused on the concept of gender have shown that its conceptual
8
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representation varies according to gender-related experience and language (Mazzuca et al., 2020;
Mazzuca et al., submitted). Overall, these studies indicate not only the importance of the
abstract/concrete distinction, but also the need to avoid taking it for granted, and the need to
study how it is differently manifested across cultures and languages.
4.1.5 Limitations of WAT and future directions
The WAT proposal has clearly some limitations. Some data on conceptual development
and language processing are hard to account for on this theory. For example, data on conceptual
acquisition showed that there was no difference in lexical decision and definition accuracy
between children with developmental language disorders (DLD) and other children (Ponari et al.,
2018). These data challenge the primacy of language for abstract concept acquisition (tenet a).
Other results challenge the role played by the mouth effector during language processing (tenet
c). Studies on first graders revealed that prolonged use of a pacifier did not have an effect on
definition accuracy (Barca et al., 2017). However, again, when looking at their content and at the
conceptual relations produced, definitions of abstract, concrete and emotional concepts were less
distinct in children who had used the pacifier beyond 3 years of age. Studies with adults revealed
that there was no facilitation of mouth responses in a lexical decision task (Mazzuca et al., 2018).
However, such a facilitation was found in a subsequent recognition task. Articulatory
suppression seems to influence a categorization task (Zannino et al., under review) but not a task
in which participants have to rate word difficulty (Villani et al., under review). It is unclear
whether this means that inner speech is not recruited with abstract concepts in certain tasks, or
whether in some cases/tasks inner speech is not specified at the articulatory level (Oppenhenim
& Dell, 2010).
Beyond the data that is difficult to account for, some issues are currently underspecified.
One example concerns the role of syntax, and its relationship with semantics in influencing
abstract concepts acquisition and use (see Desai, 2019, and the reply by Borghi et al., 2019b).
The role of syntax should be further clarified and specified. Another example pertains to the
mechanisms involved during language - and mouth motor system - recruitment. In particular, the
relationship between inner speech and mouth motor system activation, the relationship between
inner speech, metacognition and social metacognition, and the relationship between inner speech
and mind wandering should be better elucidated and further investigated. Another example
concerns the levels of embodiment, and in particular the role played by interoception, especially
for abstract concepts that are not strictly emotional. Finally, the differences between languages
also deserve more investigation (Kemmerer, 2019).
Further data should be collected to better understand at which level language (overt
language and inner speech) influences abstract concept acquisition and use, and in which tasks it
flexibly intervenes. Specifically, further studies should be conducted on development and
concept acquisition. Furthermore, more evidence should be collected to support/disconfirm the
tenets of WAT, in particular as regards the kinds of embodiment (e.g. role of interoception), the
role of inner speech, the metacognition, and the differences across languages, possibly with new
and more ecological methods (see section 5).
An important step that needs to be taken concerns the change of experimental paradigms.
So far the majority of studies have been conducted using classical behavioral tasks, while more
studies should focus and investigate the relationship between language and abstract concepts
using novel methods that capture online interaction and use of abstract concepts (see section 5).
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4.2 Language is an embodied neuroenhancement and scaffold
A seemingly paradoxical tension emerges from neuropsychological research. On the one
hand, there are remarkable cases of preserved cognitive and, specifically, conceptual abilities in
the face of significant language impairment (Lecours & Jeonette, 1980; Schaller, 2012). On the
other hand, language impairments are often comorbid with other cognitive impairments
(Noppeney & Walsh, 2000). The LENS theory defuses this tension by offering a robust account
of thinking with words within the context of grounded cognition. Its core thesis is that acquiring
a natural language transforms our conceptual ecosystem as an important component of our
flexible, multimodal, and multilevel conceptual system (Dove, 2019). It predicts that the
grounded language system actively contributes to our concepts in at least four ways:
a. Although grounded linguistic representations make important contributions to semantic
memory in general, these contributions should be greater for abstract concepts. The language
system should be more engaged in abstract concept processing than it is in concrete concept
processing.
b. The presence of a label should have a number of effects on how we conceptualize and
process a category. As grounded representations, words should actively modify and enrich
our concepts in ways that are particularly useful for abstract concepts.
c. Some conceptual content should be encoded in the associations of words with other
words.
d. Simulations of conversations should also play an important role. Because of this,
conversionation-related knowledge about word use and discourse pragmatics should
contribute to the task- and context-specific realization of concepts.
In sum, the LENS theory offers a view of how the grounded language system might augment and
enhance our concepts, particularly abstract ones. By its lights, the language system is a grounded
symbol technology that transforms our cognitive landscape broadly in the way that other
grounded symbol technologies such as mathematical notation transform our cognitive abilities
locally (Dove, 2014, 2018).
4.2.1

The role of the language system
A robust and diverse body of evidence supports the generalization that the language
system is more active during the processing of abstract concepts than it is during the processing
of other concepts. Several neuroimaging studies find that abstract words elicit greater activation
than concrete words in superior regions of the left temporal lobe (Binder et al., 2005; Giesbrecht,
Gamblin, & Swaab, 2004; Mellet, Noppeney & Price, 2004; Sabsevitz et al., 2005) and inferior
regions of the left prefrontal cortex (Binder et al., 2005; Fiebach & Friederici, 2004; Giesbrecht,
Gamblin, & Swaab, 2004; Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Noppeney & Price, 2004;
Sabsevitz et al., 2005). Meta-analyses reveal these areas to be the ones that are most likely to
show increased activation with abstract concepts (Binder et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2010). In
keeping with this, abstract nouns have been found to elicit greater activation than concrete nouns
in the left superior temporal and left inferior frontal cortex (Sabsevitz et al., 2005). Accuracy
10
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with a lexical decision task was found to decrease with abstract concepts when repetitive
transcranial magnetic stimulation or rTMS was applied over the left frontal inferior gyrus and the
left superior temporal gyrus (Papagno et al., 2009).
Neuropsychological case studies provide further support for the involvement of these
areas. A greater impairment for the processing of abstract words compared to concrete words
following has been found with left hemisphere damage, including patients who present with
aphasia (Goodglass, Hyde, & Blumsten, 1969), deep dyslexia (Coltheart, Patterson, & Marshall,
1980; Franklin, Howard, & Patterson, 1995; Shallice & Warrington, 1975), and deep dysphasia
(Katz & Goodlglass, 1990; Martin & Saffran, 1992). Reverse concreteness effects have also been
found in patients with herpes simplex encephalitis (Sirigu, Duhamel, & Poncet, 1991;
Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and patients with semantic dementia, a neurodegenerative disease
that primarily affects the anterior and inferior portions of both temporal lobes (Bonner et al.,
2009; Reilly & Peelle, 2008; Yi, Moore, & Grossman, 2007; for evidence that this pattern is not
a typical feature of semantic dementia see Hoffman & Lambon Ralph, 2011). Patients who have
undergone a selective unilateral anterior temporal resection (in either the right or left
hemisphere) exhibit a reverse concreteness effect when their performance was compared to
healthy controls and a group of patients with a more general semantic impairment (Loiselle et al.,
2012).
Taken together, this evidence suggests that the brain areas that most reliably exhibit
greater activation with abstract concepts are portions of the left ATL and the left IFG.
Subregions of these areas have been linked to the language system: the left superior ATL has
been linked to high-level speech perception and sentence comprehension (Hickok & Poeppel,
2004, 2007; Humphries et al., 2006; Vandenberghe, Nobre, & Price, 2002) and the left IFG
(which includes Broca’s area) has been linked to several types of language processing, including
auditory-verbal short-term memory, and the retrieval and selection of semantic knowledge
(Badre & Wagner, 2007; Jeffries & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Thompson-Schill, 2003). Admittedly,
this is all somewhat preliminary: not only are the neuroimaging results variable (Binder, 2007;
Mkrtychian et al., 2019), but an argument can be made that a more fine-grained accounting of
the neural circuits involved in processing concrete and abstract concepts is needed (Montefinese,
2019).
4.2.2 Words alone
The LENS theory predicts that the dynamic presence of words (as grounded
re-presentations of sensorimotor experience) should modulate how we conceptualize objects and
events in ways that are particularly helpful with abstract concepts. In keeping with this
prediction, evidence suggests that labels may preferentially activate the diagnostic features of
categories (Boutonnet & Lupyan, 2015). Verbal cues (such as the spoken word dog) appear to
activate more general representations than non-verbal cues (such as the sound of a dog barking;
Edmiston & Lupyan, 2015). If the active presence of embodied words help us process general
features, then we would expect that aphasics would struggle in comparison to age and education
matched neurologically intact controls on certain categorization tasks. Support for this is
provided by the fact that a selective impairment on categorization tasks involving
low-dimensional categories (in which the objects share few features such as “things that are
green”) has been found (Lupyan & Mirman, 2013).
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How might this influence be realized neurologically? One possibility is that words might
serve as a means of stabilizing and organizing distributed conceptual representations.
Pulvermüller (2013, 2018), for instance, proposes that the presence of linguistic representations
enable the formation of Action Perception Circuits (APCs). Learning a language, on this account,
leads to the formation of these distributed circuits by means of both Hebbian and anti-Hebbian
learning mechanisms.
4.2.3 Word-to-word associations
Knowledge of word-to-word associations is important for the acquisition of syntactic
competence as well as the capacity to produce and comprehend speech. The LENS theory
hypothesizes that associative and structural links between grounded representations of words
play an important role in our concepts. Some initial support for this is provided by the success of
models of distributed semantics that treat concepts in terms of knowledge of statistical patterns
derived from spoken and written language (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 2003; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham,
1998; Lund & Burgess, 1996). This admittedly indirect support is strengthened somewhat by the
apparent superiority of hybrid models that combine non-linguistic experiential knowledge and
language-based distributional knowledge to non-hybrid models that limit themselves to one type
or the other (Andrews, Frank, & Vigliocco, 2014; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010; Riordan & Jones,
2010).
A particularly striking real-world case is the acquisition of color concepts by congenitally
blind people (Lupyan et al., 2020). Such individuals have been shown to have a remarkable
understanding of color space and the color of objects (Dimitriva-Radojichikj, 2015; Lenci et al.,
2013; Shepard & Cooper, 1992). Researchers have shown that it is possible to recover a
significant amount of information about color from the distributional structure of color language
(Kim, Elli, & Bedny, 2019; Lewis, Zettersten, & Lupyan, 2019). A recent study finds that a
region of the left dorsal anterior temporal lobe supports the knowledge of object colors in
congenitally or early blind participants and sighted controls (Wang et al., 2020).
Although most research to date has focused on distributional properties that ignore the
structural relationships between words (even word-order), the LENS theory predicts that
knowledge of syntactic relationships should also play a role in the acquisition and use of abstract
concepts (see also Kemmerer, 2019). Developmental evidence connecting the emergence of
theory of mind abilities to the mastery of certain syntactic constructions (Astington & Jenkins,
1999; de Villiers, 2007) provides some support for this additional hypothesis (Dove, 2019).
4.2.4 Words and conversations
The LENS theory predicts that pragmatic and discourse-related knowledge indigenous to
the language system should contribute to our understanding of concepts in general and abstract
concepts in specific. In contrast to standard theories of concepts that posit fixed conceptual cores
(Machery, 2015), LENS adopts a contextualist perspective. Given that abstract concepts go
beyond our direct experience and are thus especially flexible, language may provide an important
source of invariance (Yee, 2019). Conversations may provide the means by which we are able to
dynamically coordinate the content of abstract concepts.
The LENS theory proposes that knowledge pertaining to word use shapes the contextand task-specific realization of our concepts. It proposes that conversations provide a means of
metacognitively examining and refining our conceptual knowledge. Rehearsing and imagining
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conversations with others in addition to self-directed inner speech may help us fine-tune and
adjust our concepts (Clark, 2006; Kompa, 2019). In keeping with this, evidence suggests that
folk-psychological narratives structure and influence the development of theory of mind (Berio,
2020).
We discuss both of these influences of language, the facilitation of context- and
task-sensitivity and the enhancement of metacognition, below in sections 5 and 6 respectively.
These influences warrant special emphasis because they reflect the ways in which the WAT and
LENS theories offer richer visions of the role of language in cognition than other theories.
4.2.5 Limitations of LENS and future directions
The LENS theory provides an overarching account of the role of the grounded language
system in cognition. A weakness of such an account is a lack of granularity. For example, in
contrast to the WAT theory, the LENS theory does not make specific predictions concerning the
role of the mouth motor system during conceptual processing. It predicts that distributed
sensorimotor representations should be at play but does not make detailed predictions about
specific modalities. This leaves room for future investigation into the relative contributions of
particular action and perception systems.
An important function of the LENS theory is to unify and extend the findings from more
focused research. Ultimately, its success will be measured in terms of the robustness of its
generalizations concerning the importance of grounded linguistic representations as anchors for
distributed semantic circuits, elements of associative links, and components of simulated
conversations. For a specific example of how this integration might work, the LENS theory
brings together independent and pre-existing bodies of research indicating the importance of
labels, word-to-word associations, and conversations to the development of theory of mind
(Dove, 2019). This example highlights an important feature of the LENS theory: its commitment
to a dynamic view of the impact of language on cognitive development. Future work should seek
to examine the degree to which these factors are important to the acquisition of abstract concepts
more generally.
The LENS theory fails to account for some of the same data highlighted above in our
discussion of the WAT theory. Ultimately, it would be falsified by either of two theoretical
possibilities. First, abstract concepts could be embodied in such a way that the grounded
language system does not play a central role. The LENS theory is clearly incompatible with
accounts of abstract concepts that account for them primarily in terms of nonlinguistic
sensorimotor simulations. Fortunately, this possibility fits poorly with studies that implicate the
language system in at least some abstract concepts (e.g. Harpaintner, Trumpp, & Kiefer, 2018;
Desai, Reilly, & van Dam, 2018). Second, the language system could be important to abstract
concepts but only as a source of amodal cognition (Kompa & Mueller, 2020). In contrast to this
possibility, the LENS theory predicts that future research will highlight the importance of
grounded linguistic simulations to abstract concepts.
5. Language and the flexibility of grounded cognition
Abstract concepts are more variable than concrete concepts with respect to both how they
are characterized by individuals and apply to situations. People converge with each other more in
defining and explaining the meaning of concrete than of abstract words, since these last refer to
varieties of heterogeneous and idiosyncratic experiences (e.g. “freedom”); at the same time, even
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if all concepts are continuously updated as a function of the current context, abstract concepts
vary more in the way that specific individuals represent them. In other words, our concept of
“bottle” changes less over time than our concept of “justice”. The contextual flexibility of
abstract concepts is not a new problem. Indeed, it underlies Aristotle’s well-known charge that
Plato is too quick to assume that a universal goodness is shared by all good things (Shields,
2016). Aristotle famously points out that if one looks at different examples of goodness, one
finds evidence that the term is multivocal (Aristotle, 1995).
Researchers have developed different measures of contextual flexibility. For example,
semantic diversity is a measure of the degree to which a word is used in different contexts
(Hoffman, Lambon Ralph & Rogers, 2013). Abstract words tend to rate higher on this measure
than concrete words. For example, the word spinach tends to occur in contexts relating to
cooking and eating and thus receives a relatively low semantic diversity rating while the word
life can occur in a number of different contexts and thus receives a higher rating (Hoffman,
2016). Words that have high semantic diversity irrespective of imageability take longer to
process in semantic relatedness tasks (Hoffman & Woollams, 2015). Abstract concepts also
exhibit less situational systematicity t han concrete concepts - that is, they are less constrained
with respect to the situations that they involve or invoke (Davis, Altmann, & Yee, 2020). Both of
these measures fit well with theories of concepts that view them as schemas capturing
information about how objects and events interact within real-world situations (Barsalou,
Dutriaux & Scheepers, 2018; Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017).
Even though abstract concepts are widely recognized as being highly variable across
contexts, most of the methods used to investigate how they are represented fail to take this into
account (Barsalou, 1993). The majority of studies thus far have used comprehension tasks with
single words. Researchers often use ratings on individual dimensions, such as imageability,
interoception, perceptual strength, Body Object Interaction to characterize concepts and obtain
normative data (e.g. Connell et al., 2018; Lynott et al., 2019; Tillotson et al., 2008; Della Rosa et
al., 2010; Villani et al., 2019, under review). Among the frequently used tasks are written or
auditory lexical decision tasks (e.g. Lund, Sidhu, Pexman, 2019; Ponari et al., 2018),
categorization tasks (e.g. Barca et al. 2020), recognition tasks (e.g. Mazzuca et al., 2018; Paivio,
1990), property verification tasks (e.g. Pecher et al., 2003; Borghi et al., 2011). Even though
some studies address how different tasks affect conceptual processing, the very fact that concepts
are studied in isolation prevents researchers from capturing their relative flexibility and
contextual variability. Studies that make use of simple sentences instead of single words, e.g.
requesting participants to evaluate the sensibility of different kinds of sentences (Glenberg et al.,
2008; Pecher & Boot, 2011), may reveal to some extent the variability of abstract concepts
across minimal linguistic contexts. Again, however, we believe that these methods are not
sufficiently tailored to capture how flexible abstract concepts are.
A frequently used method to investigate concepts is the feature listing task. Compared to
the aforementioned ones, this task is less constrained and lets participants more freely produce
properties associated to the target concepts; in this case, participants are required to produce
word associations, to generate features (e.g. Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Harpaintner et
al., 2018; Roversi et al., 2013) or to provide definitions (e.g. Barca et al., 2017; Ponari et al.,
2018). These tasks have the advantage of better reflecting the dynamics of the current situation
than the other methods which consider words in isolation or embedded within very simple
sentences. However, feature listing tasks also have some limitations: for example, people tend to
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list fewer features for abstract than for concrete concepts, and the short sentences they produce
might not be able to capture the complexity of the underlying conceptual representation
(Zdrazilova et al., 2018).
As recently argued by Barsalou (2020), we need to investigate concepts in the context of
situated action. We are convinced that researchers need to go even further, and to profit from
new methods developed in psychology and neuroscience that might be employed in order to
investigate acquisition and use of concepts with interactive paradigms. The recent understanding
that multiple dimensions, including language and sociocultural practices, have a crucial role for
concepts renders it pivotal to promote a shift of paradigms.
A recent example of a promising task has been provided by Zdrazilova, Sidhu and
Pexman (2018) who analyzed words and gestures used during the taboo task, in which
participants had to communicate the meaning of an abstract word without using the word
themselves. Gestures can provide important clues to gain information on the underlying
conceptual system (Hostetter & Alibali, 2008). They found that when using abstract instead of
concrete words participants, not only referred more frequently to people and used more
introspective features, but also used more metaphorical and beat gestures. Conversely, when
participants used concrete words they referred more frequently to objects and entities, and used
more iconic gestures.
So far to our knowledge few researchers have investigated abstractness by means of
interactive paradigms. However, some recent developments in the literature offer fruitful
suggestions for developing novel methods. Some examples: There is a broad and well
established line of research investigating joint action from an embodied perspective, in which a
variety of interactive tasks are adopted (e.g. Knoblich, Butterfill & Sebanz, 2011; Galantucci &
Sebanz, 2009; Pezzulo et al., 2017). Furthermore, interesting approaches have been developed
that consider dialogue as a form of joint action (e.g. Pickering & Garrod, 2013). Other recent
studies investigate the use of abstraction (not of abstractness) in interactive tasks such as Lego
constructions or problem-solving situations (e.g. Bjørndahl et al., 2014; Tylen et al., 2018). This
literature, which mainly adopts behavioral and kinematic methods, can provide useful hints about
how to change and update our methods of investigating concepts. At the same time, naturalistic
methods are increasingly spreading in neuroscience, and proponents of dual person neuroscience
emphasize the importance of studying neural and cognitive processes in the context of social
interaction (Schilbach, 2015; Redcay & Schilbach, 2019). For example, studies adopting these
approaches directly investigate emotions in interactive contexts (Nummenmaa et al., 2012) both
in neurotypical populations and other populations, e.g. individuals with an autism spectrum
condition (Stevanovic et al., 2019). Because abstract concepts are more variable across contexts
compared to concrete concepts, and because they are more strongly influenced by the social
dimension, it is high time to take inspiration from other domains in order to start employing
novel, interactive methods to investigate their use (Falandays & Spivey, 2019).
Some of the evidence from cognitive neuroscience can be reevaluated in light of the
full-bodied contextualism embraced by both WAT and LENS. As mentioned above, one of the
more reliable findings from brain imaging studies is that the LIFG is more active during the
processing of abstract concepts than it is in the processing concrete concepts (e.g. Binder et al.,
2005; Fiebach & Friederici, 2004; Noppeney & Price, 2004; Papagno et al., 2009). There have
been two main theoretical accounts of the contribution of the LIFG (Della Rosa, Catricala,
Canini, Vigliocco, & Cappa, 2018). On the first, the LIFG engages a network of circuits
15

Words have a weight
associated with language processing (Barca et al., 2011; Goldberg et al., 2007; Wang et al.,
2010). On the second, the LIFG handles the semantic control functions that enable the selection
of appropriate aspects of meaning in a specific context (Fiebach & Friederici, 2004; Hoffman,
Binney, & Lambon Ralph, 2015; Noppeney & Price, 2004). Manipulating both imageability and
context availability, a recent study found evidence that the LIFG was involved in two separate
networks: one associated with low imageability located primarily in the left hemisphere and the
other associated with low context availability located primarily in the right hemisphere (Della
Rosa et al., 2018). If this evidence holds up, we have reason to think that the language system
contributes both to the representation of abstract concepts and their contextual flexibility.
6. Inner speech and metacognition
In this section, we argue that inner speech may play a number of metacognitive roles in
abstract concept processing. Classical research on inner speech has been linked to two influential
traditions, one started by Vygotsky (1934), according to which inner speech would be a
condensed inner conversation endowed with a regulatory function, and one linked to working
memory research (Baddeley, 2010). The legacy of Vygotsky is certainly more relevant for us,
but we think that both views can contribute in explaining how inner speech might be employed
in the context of abstract concepts.
The importance of inner speech is viewed by the framework of the WAT theory as a way
to explain the activation of the mouth motor system. Such activation was consistently found in a
variety of studies. Mouth activation was found with behavioral tasks with adults and children
when comparing abstract with concrete concepts (e.g. Barca et al., 2017, 2019, 2020; Borghi et
al., 2011; Borghi & Zarcone, 2016; Granito et al., 2015; Mazzuca et al., 2018, see section 3) but
also with ratings and with fMRI with abstract mental state concepts when compared with other
kinds of concrete and abstract concepts (Dreyer & Pulvermüller, 2018; Ghio, Vaghi &
Tettamanti, 2013). Mouth activation specifically does not play an important role in the LENS
theory, but it does fit with this theory’s commitment to the idea that simulations of language
experience serve as a means of inner grounding.
We view inner speech as a form of real speech, engaging the motor system in a way that
is similar to overt conversation and with sensorial dimensions that can potentially involve not
only audition but also tactile and visual sensory modalities (Loevenbruck et al., 2018; see for a
different vision, for which not only phono-articulatory but also auditory imagery is necessary,
Langland-Hassan, 2018). The auditory dimensions might be differentially involved depending on
the stage of development, for example neurodevelopmental models suggest that auditory
feedback is crucial during the early stages of language acquisition but is less prominent later.
Crucial for us is the fact that the phono-articulatory and sensory component is linked to the
semantic one (Bermúdez, 2018; Carruthers, 2018): in our view, inner speech might be condensed
and synthetic, but it certainly brings semantic content.
For one, inner speech can be employed as a way to re-enact the modality of acquisition of
words: that is, as emphasized by Vygotsky (see also Morin, 2018), we internalize social
exchanges, including conversations. Inner speech could thus provide a means - and not
necessarily the only one - to simulate the social context of conceptual acquisition by internally
rehearsing the experienced social exchanges. This is consistent with the activation of the left IFG
during abstract word processing: as shown in a meta-analysis by Morin & Hamper (2012) of
brain imaging studies involving self-referential thinking, which found the highest activation rate
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of inner speech (77%) in studies that involve retrieval of autobiographical information. In this
case the use of inner speech may involve a form of working memory that engages the
phono-articulatory loop.
Inner speech may also represent a form of second-order cognition (Clark, 1998) or
metacognition, a form of thought aimed at reflecting on our own thought processes. It can
therefore be seen as a monitoring mechanism endowed with a predictive role (Pickering &
Garrod, 2013; Carruthers, 2018; Loevenbruck et al., 2018; Swiney, 2018). This mechanism has
been considered as especially active and helpful during early word acquisition, as revealed by
work on 18-month-olds showing that they innerly name objects displayed in visual images (e.g.
Mani & Plunkett, 2010). We hypothesize that it might be more extensively used during abstract
than it is during concrete concept acquisition, both because abstract words can rarely be learned
through ostension (e.g. pointing to a referent) and because of their lower frequency. More
importantly, this monitoring mechanism might be crucial during abstract word processing and
word production. In our view, the meanings of abstract concepts generate more uncertainty than
those of concrete ones, and a stronger and longer monitoring process is often needed. Basically,
we are less certain of the meanings of abstract words, less confident in how well we understand
them, and less sure of how proficient we are in using them. We have recently proposed (Borghi,
Fini & Tummolini, under review) that this awareness of our knowledge limits (Shea, 2018)
might have two possible outcomes: it might lead us to continue searching the meaning or to
prepare us to ask information to others (social metacognition, Borghi et al., 2018b, 2019a). Both
activities could occur through inner speech. Notice that we do not necessarily assume that these
processes occur sequentially, i.e. monitoring might coexist with meaning search and with social
metacognition, with oscillations back and forth and possibly even a feedback loop.
In this case inner speech would be more strictly related to the preparation of real speech speech that might, however, remain implicit and never become overt. The motoric component
would play a prominent role, but it could be accompanied by the sensorial auditory component.
Importantly, as underlined elsewhere, we think that these mechanisms can coexist. In keeping
with this, Alderson-Day et al. (2016) have distinguished between a monologic and a dialogic
form of inner speech, which engages a broader and more bilateral network of neural areas going
beyond the left frontotemporal linguistic regions.
Collecting experimental evidence is of paramount importance in order to disentangle
these mechanisms and better identify their roles. In particular, future studies should clarify
whether, and in which, processing phases inner speech is involved. Our hypothesis is that it
facilitates word acquisition but also plays an equally important role during word processing and
production. Furthermore, this evidence should help us to understand which components of inner
speech are activated – we predict that if it is mainly involved as a form of working memory and
is used to search for meaning, then phono-articulatory aspects would be important; in the case of
social metacognition, instead, motor preparation would dominate. Notice that in both cases inner
speech would have an important predictive and preparatory role, as interpretations of inner
speech in terms of predictive coding clearly highlight (Swiney, 2018).
Another potentially important issue concerns the relationship between inner speech, mind
wandering, and abstract concepts. Bastian et al. (2017) recently investigated the relationship
between inner speech and mind wandering. They demonstrated that the likelihood of
spontaneous mind wandering was impaired during articulatory suppression, which notably
suppresses inner speech, while the presentation of verbal material did not influence the
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likelihood of mind wandering. They used an ecological method, using a smartphone application
where participants received questions on mind-wandering episodes, their awareness and their
verbal, visual and auditory vividness. Inner speech vividness was positively correlated with
awareness of mind wandering, while such awareness was not predicted by visual and auditory
vividness. Hence, inner speech and mind wandering appear to be related. In future studies we
intend to explore the relationship between mind wandering and abstract concepts. Abstract
concepts are less bounded to a specific concrete referent and evoke different contexts; in a
similar fashion, mind wandering tends to be unrelated to the current task (Christoff et al., 2016;
Ciaramelli & Treves, 2019), hence we hypothesize that they could activate more mind wandering
than more concrete concepts.
In this section, we have identified several ways in which inner speech may underwrite
metacognition and the flexible use of abstract concepts, and we have pointed to novel methods
for investigating such dynamic and interactive phenomena. These functions and novel methods
fit well with the general claim that language itself is a form of grounded cognition and the
specific proposals at the heart of the WAT and LENS theories concerning the importance of the
simulation of speech in abstract concept acquisition and use. They do not fit well with more
minimal accounts of the contribution of language to our concepts that focus on language as a
cognitive shortcut or a source of distributional information (e.g. Barsalou et al., 2008; Louwerse
& Jeuniaux, 2010; Lynott & Connell, 2010; Tillas, 2015).
7. Conclusion
The idea that the language system might contribute to grounded cognition is shared by
several recent theories. Few of them, though, explicitly focus on the acquisition, representation
and use of abstract concepts in a sustained manner. In contrast, both the WAT and LENS
theories offer full-throated accounts of how language serves as a source of inner grounding and
social action for abstract concepts.
According to the WAT theory, language is not simply a cognitive shortcut dependent on
superficial processing. Words are not merely placeholders but are instead tools for action within
our social niche. Specifically, they are physical tools that change and refine our perception of the
external environment; they are inner tools that modify and enhance our thoughts; and they are
social tools that allow us to interact with others (Borghi, under review). They are acquired and
are used in ways that dynamically interact with the social context. Since instances of abstract
concepts are typically more heterogeneous and diverse than those of concrete concepts, WAT
proposes that linguistic and social input is particularly crucial for their acquisition, and that this
experience influences their representation and use. Furthermore, during language use we might
be more uncertain on abstract than on concrete word meaning; this might push us to actively
search for the help of others (social metacognition, Borghi et al., 2018b); this recognition of
others as dispensers of knowledge (Fini & Borghi, 2019) might foster and promote social bonds
(Borghi & Tummolini, in press). While WAT has mainly stressed the importance of words as
social tools, it also emphasizes the importance of language as an inner tool that enhances our
cognitive abilities through the use of inner speech.
According to the LENS theory, language supports a form of thinking that would not
otherwise be available because linguistic competence amounts to the ability to manipulate a
physically instantiated combinatorial symbol system. Importantly, the symbols themselves
require distributed multimodal simulations of physical events and are fundamentally tied to our
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embodied experience. Having access to these symbols enhances cognition and enables us to
capture and communicate about concepts that go beyond our direct experience. Abstract
concepts often depend on the presence of words as labels, the statistical and structural
relationships between words, and the pragmatic capacity to generate and respond to
conversations.
Examining these theories together sharpens our understanding of each, highlighting their
possible strengths and weaknesses, but it also accomplishes something more: it demonstrates the
promise of a research program focused on the role of language in abstract concepts within the
context of a flexible, multimodal, and multilevel conception of embodied cognition. In addition
to reviewing the tenets of each theory and the evidence supporting them, we have identified
some revealing preliminary research and discussed the need to adopt new experimental
paradigms.
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